Firm Heterogeneity and Wages in Unionised Labour Markets: Theory and Evidence by Paulo Bastos et al.
       
   research paper series 










Research Paper 2008/38 
 
Firm Heterogeneity and Wages in Unionised Labour Markets:  
























The Centre acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust            
under Programme Grant F/00 114/AM   
 
The Authors 
Paulo Bastos is an Economist at the European Commission and a Policy Associate of GEP. 
Natália P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor at the University of Minho. Odd Rune Straume is 





























We thank Frode Meland, Miguel Portela, Jeffrey Wooldridge and two anonymous referees for 
valuable comments. The views expressed in this paper belong to the authors only and do not 
necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission.  
Firm Heterogeneity and Wages in Unionised Labour Markets:  








In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by 
firm-specific arrangements determining actual paid wages as a mark-up on the industry wage floor. 
What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage 
floor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity 
in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. 
Furthermore, since the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more 
heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model 
of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They 
are then confirmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining 
agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000. 
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In many European countries, wages are set in two stages. First, industry-level collective bargaining 
establishes a binding wage floor, common to all firms in the industry. At a second stage, firm specific 
arrangements determine a mark-up on top of the central wage. Such a two-tiered wage setting system 
tends to originate a large difference between actual paid wages and the central wage floor, a phenomena 
typically referred to as the wage cushion or the wage drift. 
The relative merits of a wage setting system of this sort have been subject to considerable interest and 
debate for many years now, but controversy remains. On one side has been the view that a move towards 
a more decentralised collective bargaining system would allow wages to better reflect local economic 
conditions, and thereby yield a more efficient allocation of resources. On the other side has been the 
argument that a large wage cushion means that significant room exists already for adjusting wages at the 
local level, implying that centralised bargaining has little, if any, impact on actual worker compensation. At 
the roots of this controversy appear to be, thus, different perceptions about the relative importance of 
each of the two-levels of the wage setting process, with the former view implicitly attributing more 
importance to the central level and the latter to the local level. 
But what is it then that determines the relative importance of the two levels in such a two-tired wage 
setting system? Do centrally negotiated wages matter for actual worker compensation? The key 
contribution of this paper is to show that both the industry wage floor and the average wage cushion are 
systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry. The industry wage floor is 
negatively correlated, while the average wage cushion is positively correlated, with the productivity 
spread. The main intuition for these results is that in industries with more heterogeneous firms an 
industry-wide union has a rational incentive to impose a lower wage floor in order to preclude job losses in 
less productive firms. Greater firm heterogeneity and a lower wage floor, on the other hand, leave more 
room for firm-specific rent-sharing, thereby increasing the average wage cushion. Furthermore, we show 
that the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, implying that workers in more 
heterogeneous industries tend to get lower wages, and hence that centralised bargaining does matter for 
actual worker compensation. 
To formalise these arguments we develop a model of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity 
heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. The model predictions are then confirmed by 
administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining agreements of the 
Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000. 1 Introduction
In many European countries, wages are set in two stages. First, industry-level collective bargaining
establishes a binding wage ﬂoor, common to all ﬁrms in the industry. At a second stage, ﬁrm-
speciﬁc arrangements determine a mark-up on top of the central wage. Such a two-tiered wage
setting system tends to originate a large diﬀerence between actual paid wages and the central wage
ﬂoor, a phenomena typically referred to as the wage cushion or the wage drift.1
The relative merits of a wage setting system of this sort have been subject to considerable
interest and debate for many years now, but controversy remains.2 On one side has been the view
that a move towards a more decentralised collective bargaining system would allow wages to better
reﬂect local economic conditions, and thereby yield a more eﬃcient allocation of resources. On
the other side has been the argument that a large wage cushion means that signiﬁcant room exists
already for adjusting wages at the local level, implying that centralised bargaining has little, if
any, impact on actual worker compensation. At the roots of this controversy appear to be, thus,
diﬀerent perceptions about the relative importance of each of the two-levels of the wage setting
process, with the former view implicitly attributing more importance to the central level and the
latter to the local level.
But what is it then that determines the relative importance of the two levels in such a two-tired
wage setting system? Do centrally negotiated wages matter for actual worker compensation? The
key contribution of this paper is to show that both the industry wage ﬂoor and the average wage
cushion are systematically associated with the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity in the industry. The
industry wage ﬂoor is negatively correlated, while the average wage cushion is positively correlated,
with the productivity spread. The main intuition for these results is that in industries with more
heterogeneous ﬁrms an industry-wide union has a rational incentive to impose a lower wage ﬂoor
in order to preclude job losses in less productive ﬁrms. Greater ﬁrm heterogeneity and a lower
wage ﬂoor, on the other hand, leave more room for ﬁrm-speciﬁc rent-sharing, thereby increasing
the average wage cushion. Furthermore, we show that the response of the wage ﬂoor dominates
that of the wage cushion, implying that workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower
wages, and hence that centralised bargaining does matter for actual worker compensation.
To formalise these arguments, we develop a model of Cournot oligopoly with ﬁrm productivity
heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. At the outset, an industry-wide monopoly
1Such a two-tiered wage setting process is prevalent in the Nordic countries (Calmfors, 1990; Holden, 1989, 1998),
Germany (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003), Italy (Ordine, 1995), Spain (Dolado et al, 1997), The Netherlands (Butter
and Eppink, 2003) and Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005). Following Cardoso and Portugal (2005), throughout
this paper we will use the expression wage cushion to label the diﬀerence between actual wages and the union wage
ﬂoor, noting however that the concept wage drift has also been frequently adopted in the literature to designate this
phenomena.
2See, e.g., Flanagan (1999) and OECD (2004), and the references cited therein.
2union sets a wage ﬂoor, common to all producers. At a second stage, ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages and
employment are determined. To characterise wage determination at the local level, we adopt
a general formulation of rent-sharing, which is consistent with diﬀerent underlying mechanisms
proposed in the literature to explain its existence − namely, ﬁrm-speciﬁc fair wage policies and local
bargaining. When setting the wage ﬂoor at the outset of the game, the central union anticipates
the implications of its actions for the determination of actual wages and employment at the second
stage. The model yields clear and intuitive predictions about the eﬀect of ﬁrm heterogeneity —
measured as a mean-preserving spread of labour productivities — on wage setting. Notably, for
‘reasonable’ parameter conﬁgurations, we ﬁnd that more heterogeneity leads to a lower industry
wage ﬂoor and a higher (average) wage cushion; since the former of these eﬀects tends to dominate
the latter, all else equal workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower wages.
We then proceed by taking the model predictions to the data. With that aim, we exploit Quadros
de Pessoal, an unusually comprehensive administrative worker-ﬁrm dataset that is particularly well
suited for investigating this question. Quadros de Pessoal comprises information on virtually all
workers, ﬁrms and collective bargaining agreements for the Portuguese private sector. It also allows
to distinguish, at the individual-level, between the industry wage ﬂoor and the wage cushion. Since
there is a unique identiﬁer for the collective agreement that covers each worker, it is possible to
determine the exact set of ﬁrms that constitute the industry for collective bargaining purposes.
Given that there is also information on the ﬁrm side, we are able to compute standard measures
of ﬁrm productivity heterogeneity in each industry, and then test whether they are systematically
associated with the industry wage ﬂoor and the average wage cushion (and hence with actual paid
wages). The econometric results conﬁrm our theoretical predictions.
This paper relates to several strands of existing research. There are some structural similarities
between the model presented here and a relatively small literature on unionised labour markets
with a two-tiered wage setting process. Inspired by the collective bargaining system of the Nordic
countries, Holden (1998) provides a model in which local unions make use of ‘work-to-rule’ practices
to negotiate a wage rate that exceeds the central wage ﬂoor.3 The link between the two tiers of the
wage determination process is explicitly modelled: when bargaining at the industry-level, central
unions fully anticipate that the negotiated wage will constitute the fall-back position of ﬁrm-level
unions during subsequent local bargaining. As a result, the expected wage cushion is fully reﬂected
in central negotiations. A competing view associates the wage cushion with eﬃciency wage policies
pursued by the ﬁrms. Muysken and van Veen (1996) oﬀer a model in which, rather than forced by
local unions to divide an exogenous amount of rents, employers have a rational incentive to pay a
mark-up on top of the contractual wage in order to maximise worker eﬀort. Their paper provides,
3Holden (1988), Hibbs and Locking (1996) and Ordine (1996) provide related contributions.
3therefore, an alternative explanation for the wage cushion, which is expected to be particularly
relevant in countries where centralised negotiations are not typically followed by local collective
bargaining.4 A common feature of this line of work is the use of a representative ﬁrm framework.
Therefore, the implication of ﬁrm heterogeneity for wage setting — which is the central focus of our
paper — is never an issue in this literature.
A set of contributions in the union-oligopoly literature are also relevant in our context. The
seminal paper by Dowrick (1989), and several extensions (e.g., Dhillon and Petrakis, 2002), oﬀer
oligopoly models with centralised union wage setting.5 There are, however, two crucial diﬀerences
between this line of work and our paper. First, the assumption that ﬁrms are homogeneous. Second,
the absence of local (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) wage setting following centralised bargaining. As a result, in all
these models the actual paid wage is always equal to the central contracted wage.
We would also like to draw attention to a recent literature on how ﬁrm heterogeneity inﬂuences
wage determination. Building on the inﬂuential paper of Melitz (2003), recent work by Egger and
Kreickemeier (2008) and Davis and Harrigan (2007) shows that, in the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
eﬃciency wage policies, ﬁrm heterogeneity leads to diﬀerent wages for ex-ante identical workers.6
Neither of these papers, however, focuses on union wage setting or two-tiered wage setting systems.
Finally, we would like to place our empirical work within the existing literature. The empirical
analysis by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) is clearly the closest to our own. Using the same dataset
employed in this paper, they propose a new methodology to infer the contractual wage for each
job category from actual paid wages. Speciﬁcally, they show that the mode of the distribution of
the base wage for each job category within each collective agreement corresponds with remarkable
accuracy to the wage set through collective bargaining.7 We will use the same procedure here to
compute the union wage ﬂoor and the wage cushion. Cardoso and Portugal then report evidence
that a signiﬁcant proportion of workers covered by collective agreements actually receive wages
well above the union wage ﬂoor. Although agreements are not ordinarily supplemented by local
collective bargaining, ﬁrms unilaterally adjust wage policies to reﬂect their speciﬁc conditions.
Using a cross-section of the matched worker-ﬁrm data for 1999, they ﬁnd that the wage cushion
stretches the returns to worker and ﬁrm attributes. Crucially, however, Cardoso and Portugal
do not focus on how the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity inﬂuences wage setting, which is the main
contribution of this paper.
4A limiting feature of their model, however, is that the central wage ﬂoor is exogenous throughout the analysis.
5Bastos and Kreickemeier (2008) provide a related analysis in a general equilibrium context.
6The main focus of these papers is then on how trade liberalisation is likely to aﬀect within-group wage inequality,
and other labour market outcomes.
7To support this claim, they examine the relationship between the contractual wage for each worker category,
obtained directly from published collective agreements, and the corresponding modal base wage in some pre-selected
industries. Such comparisons conﬁrm the high accuracy of this indicator, which is then applied in the remaining
analysis.
4The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical
model and derive predictions for the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical
implementation. Our empirical ﬁndings are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 A theoretical model
Consider an industry consisting of two ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated product. Inverse
demand for the two products is given by
pi = a − qi − bqj, i,j = 1,2, i  = j, (1)
where qi is quantity of product i, supplied by ﬁrm i, and b ∈ (0,1) is an inverse measure of the
degree of product diﬀerentiation. Where appropriate, we will later refer to b as a measure of the
intensity of competition in the industry.
Each ﬁrm uses labour as the only factor of production in a constant-returns-to-scale technology,
given by the following production functions:
q1 = φ(1 + s)l1, (2)
q2 = φ(1 − s)l2. (3)
We introduce heterogeneity among ﬁrms, not workers. Workers are assumed to be ex ante identical,
but technological (or managerial) diﬀerences among ﬁrms imply that ﬁrm heterogeneity is reﬂected
in diﬀerences in labour productivity. The mean productivity in the industry is given by φ, while
the parameter s ∈ (0,1) measures the productivity spread (or the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity).8
We make the crucial assumption that the wage a ﬁrm has to pay its workers reﬂects ﬁrm-level
rent-sharing. One way to obtain this feature is to adopt the ‘fair wage’ hypothesis. Assume, as
in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), that workers condition their eﬀort on the wage paid relative to the
wage considered to be fair. If workers receive at least the ‘fair wage’, they provide a normal level
of eﬀort. By an appropriate choice of eﬀort function, it will then be optimal for the ﬁrm to pay the
8It is worth pointing out that the duopoly assumption is made for expositional simplicity and is not crucial for
the generality of the results. It can easily be veriﬁed that our main results are qualitatively unaﬀected by adding
more ﬁrms to the industry while maintaining a symmetric ﬁrm heterogeneity.
5fair wage.9 With this assumption, proﬁts are given by
πi = pqi − wili, i = 1,2, (4)
where wi is the fair wage paid to workers at ﬁrm i.
It remains to establish the determinants of the fair wage. We use an internal reference per-
spective and assume that the fair wage depends on the ﬁrm’s ability to pay. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that the fair wage is given by a weighted average of the wage set by a central trade
union and the ﬁrm’s revenue per worker.10 The former constitutes a contracted wage ﬂoor for the
industry, while the latter is the ﬁrm’s maximum possible wage oﬀer. Denoting the contracted wage
ﬂoor by w, the fair wage in ﬁrm i is given by






where β ∈ (0,1) is the weight attached to the wage ﬂoor relative to the maximum possible wage oﬀer.
When the fair wage is, to some degree, determined by internal factors, intra-industry diﬀerences in
labour productivity will be reﬂected in wage diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Notice also that there is an
obvious analytical advantage of this particular speciﬁcation, namely that a similar wage outcome
can result from local wage bargaining.11 Thus, we can alternatively interpret β as the relative
bargaining power of the ﬁrm in local bargaining.
The industry wage ﬂoor, w, is set by a central monopoly trade union representing all workers




(wi − r)li, (6)
where r is the reservation wage level. Standard assumptions on the determinants of r would be the
minimum wage level, the level of unemployment beneﬁts, or simply the disutility of work.12






where w is the actual paid wage and w
∗ is the fair wage, the ﬁrm will not beneﬁt from paying less than the fair wage,
since eﬀort decreases proportionally if the wage falls short of what the workers consider to be fair.
10This deﬁnition of a fair wage is similar in spirit to the one used by Danthine and Kurmann (2006). A somewhat
diﬀerent internal reference perspective is used by Akerlof and Yellen (1990), who assume that workers of diﬀerent
skills compare their wages to other co-workers within the same ﬁrm.
11It is straightforward to show that the wage given in (5) corresponds exactly to the wage resulting from eﬃcient
bargaining between the ﬁrm and a rent-maximising local union, where the disagreement payoﬀs of both parties are
zero.
12With heterogeneous ﬁrms, there would be an incentive for a central union to wage discriminate, by setting
ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage ﬂoors. Wage discrimination by a central trade union is, however, rarely observed in practice, a fact
6Assuming Cournot competition between the ﬁrms in the industry, we consider the following
sequence of events:
1. The central trade union sets the wage ﬂoor w that applies for the industry.
2. The ﬁrms simultaneously and independently choose employment levels, taking into account
the wage rates they need to pay in order to induce normal eﬀort from their workers.
3. Production takes place and payoﬀs are realised.
2.1 Solving for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
For a given wage ﬂoor, w, the two ﬁrms decide how many workers to hire, taking into account that
they have to pay them the fair wage, given by (5), to induce normal worker eﬀort. This yields the
following labour demand functions13
l1 (w) =
aφ(1 − s)(1 + s) − w(1 − 3s)
3bφ2 (1 − s)(1 + s)
2 , (7)
l2 (w) =
aφ(1 − s)(1 + s) − w(1 + 3s)
3bφ2 (1 − s)
2 (1 + s)
. (8)
The corresponding fair wages are then found by inserting the equilibrium expressions for l1 (w) and
l2 (w) into (5), yielding
w1 (w) =
aφ(1 − s)(1 + s)(2 − b)(1 − β) + w(2 − b)(1 + b + β) − ws(2 + b)(1 − b + β)




aφ(1 − s)(1 + s)(2 − b)(1 − β) + w(2 − b)(1 + b + β) + ws(2 + b)(1 − b + β)
(1 + s)(2 + b)(2 − b)
. (10)
It is straightforward to verify that wages paid at both ﬁrms are increasing in the wage ﬂoor, and
that the wage diﬀerence (w1−w2) is increasing in the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity, as measured by
s.
that can be explained by bargaining costs and/or egalitarian norms.
13We assume that labour demand is always positive for both ﬁrms, ruling out the possibility that the least
productive ﬁrm might not survive in the market. This essentially requires that the productivity spread, s, is suﬃciently
low.
7At the outset of the game, the wage ﬂoor is set by a central rent-maximising trade union. Thus,
w is given by





aφ(1 − s)(1 + s)(2 − b)(b + 2β) + r(2 + b)
￿




2 (1 + b + β) + s2 (2 + b)
2 (1 − b + β)
￿ . (11)
From (9)-(10) and (11) it is immediately evident that both the wage ﬂoor and the actually
paid wages are increasing in the level of labour productivity (φ), as expected. For the subsequent
analysis of the wage eﬀects of ﬁrm heterogeneity, it is useful to deﬁne some wage concepts. The





while the average (actual paid) wage is given by ω = w +  .
2.2 Firm heterogeneity and wages
In this section we use our model to analyse the main question posed in the paper; how the distrib-
ution of ﬁrm productivities in a given unionised industry aﬀect wage setting, at industry and ﬁrm
level.
2.2.1 The wage ﬂoor
The eﬀect of ﬁrm heterogeneity on the industry wage ﬂoor is derived from (11):
∂w
∂s
= −2s(2 − b)
2 aφ
￿
4(1 + β) − b2 (3 − β)
￿




2 (1 + b + β) + s2 (2 + b)
2 (1 − b + β)
￿2 . (12)
The sign of this expression is determined by the sign of the numerator. Since this is clearly positive,
implying ∂w/∂s < 0, if r → 0, b → 0 or β → 1, we establish the most general result of this section:
Proposition 1 A higher degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity in the industry will reduce the wage ﬂoor if
one or more of the following conditions are met:
(i) The reservation wage level, r, is suﬃciently low.
(ii) The degree of competition in the industry, b, is suﬃciently low.
(iii) The ﬁrms’ share of rents, β, is suﬃciently high.
The intuition for this result is not straightforward. The central union’s wage setting incentives
can be decomposed into two diﬀerent channels: the eﬀect of the wage ﬂoor on (i) aggregate em-
8ployment and (ii) actual wages. Increased ﬁrm heterogeneity will change the union’s wage setting
incentives through both channels, and in opposite directions.
(i) Increased ﬁrm heterogeneity implies that aggregate employment becomes more elastic with













2 − b + s2 (2 + b)
￿
w
φa(1 − s)(1 + s)(2 − b) − (2 − b + (2 + b)s2)w
, (13)





[φa(1 − s)(1 + s)(2 − b) − (2 − b + (2 + b)s2)w]
2 > 0. (14)
A decomposition of the elasticity shows that more heterogeneity increases (reduces) labour demand
elasticity for the low (high) productivity ﬁrm. This is because higher (lower) labour productivity
reduces (increases) the eﬀect of an increase in the eﬀective wage rate (i.e., the price of one eﬃciency
unit of labour) on labour demand. Notice, however, that the impact of a (marginal) change in
labour productivity on the relationship between the wage rate and the eﬀective wage rate, is
smaller the higher the labour productivity is. Therefore, the eﬀect on labour demand elasticity
in the low-productivity ﬁrm is always dominating. Thus, all else equal, a central union in a more
heterogeneous industry will set a lower wage ﬂoor to stimulate employment in the low-productivity
ﬁrm.
(ii) Increased ﬁrm heterogeneity also aﬀects how an increase in the wage ﬂoor translates into
an increase in actual paid wages. Speciﬁcally, the positive relationship between the wage ﬂoor and
actual wages becomes overall stronger. From (9) and (10) we can see that it becomes stronger for





(2 − b)(2 + b)(1 − s)





(2 − b)(2 + b)(s + 1)
2 < 0, (16)








￿ ￿ ￿. Thus, all else equal, a central union in a more hetero-
geneous industry will set a higher wage ﬂoor to induce higher actual wages in the most productive
ﬁrm.
The relative strengths of these two opposite incentives are determined by the parameter conﬁg-
uration. A lower reservation wage level means that, all else equal, employment eﬀects are relatively
more important, strengthening the ﬁrst incentive relative to the second. On the other hand, a
9lower degree of competition and a lower degree of local rent-sharing imply that the relationship
between the wage ﬂoor and actual wages are less inﬂuenced by ﬁrm heterogeneity, making the
second incentive less important. Why? Because less competition in the market means that pro-
ductivity diﬀerences are to a lesser extent reﬂected in relative market shares. Consequently, more
heterogeneity has a lower impact on the allocation of rents, which partly determine the actual paid
wages, when there is less competition in the industry. Similarly, if the ﬁrms share less rents with
their workers, productivity diﬀerences translate, to a lower degree, into diﬀerences in actual wages.
Thus, less competition and/or less local rent-sharing imply that the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity
has a lower impact on the relationship between the wage ﬂoor and actual paid wages. Indeed, from
(15) and (16) we see that the relationship between w and wi is independent of s, if b → 0 or β → 1.
It should be emphasised that the parameter conﬁguration that yields a positive relationship
between ﬁrm heterogeneity and the industry wage ﬂoor is quite limited. To provide an illustration
of this, consider the case of maximum competition, b = 1. In this case, it is possible to show
that ∂w/∂s < 0, for all admissible values of r, if β >
2−3s(1+s)
5+3s(2−s) (< 0.4). Thus, for ‘reasonable’
parameter conﬁgurations, the dominant incentive of the central union is to stimulate employment
in low-productivity ﬁrms, resulting in a lower wage ﬂoor in more heterogeneous industries.
2.2.2 The wage cushion
For the sake of analytical feasibility, we will explore the eﬀects of ﬁrm heterogeneity on the wage
cushion, and thus on actual wages, by considering the special case of homogeneous products and
a zero reservation wage.14 This restricts the parameter conﬁgurations to a subset where there is
always a negative relationship between the degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity and the wage ﬂoor, which,
as argued above, we consider to be the most likely case. Setting b = 1 and r = 0, the equilibrium
wage expressions are given by
w =
aφ(2β + 1)(1 − s)(1 + s)
2(2 + β + 9βs2)
, (17)
η1 =
aφ(1 + s)(1 − β)[1 + s + 2sβ (1 + 3s)]
2(2 + β + 9βs2)
, (18)
η2 =
aφ(1 − s)(1 − β)[1 − s − 2sβ (1 − 3s)]
2(2 + β + 9βs2)
, (19)
ω =
aφ(1 − s)(1 + s)
￿
1 + 4s2β (1 − β)
￿
2(1 + s2 (4β − 1))
. (20)
It is easily shown that increased ﬁrm heterogeneity will increase (decrease) the wage cushion in
14Notice that assuming a zero reservation wage is equivalent to letting the central trade union maximise the total
wage bill.
10the high (low) productivity ﬁrm; ∂η1/∂s > 0 and ∂η2/∂s < 0, as expected. More interesting is the







2 (1 + s)
2 + Ψ
￿
(4s2β − s2 + 1)
2 (β + 9s2β + 2)
2 , (21)
where Ψ = −648s8β4 + 162s8β3 − 144s6β4 − 576s6β3 + 72s6β2 − 8s4β4 − 100s4β3 − 198s4β2 +
8s4β + 32s2β3 + 12s2β2 − 24s2β + 2β3 + 10β2 + 8β.
The sign of (21) is given by the sign of the numerator, where the sign of Ψ is a priori ambiguous.
By numerical simulations, it can be shown that ∂ /∂s > 0, for all β, if s < s ≈ 0.48. Since s
measures the percentage diﬀerence from the mean, s < s appears to be a weak condition. Thus, we
conclude that, for ‘reasonable’ parameter conﬁgurations, a higher degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity leads
to a lower industry wage ﬂoor but a higher average wage cushion. An increase in the productivity
spread implies a more uneven distribution of rents. For a given wage ﬂoor, this should lead to
a lower (higher) wage cushion in low (high) productivity ﬁrms. However, since the central union
responds by lowering the industry wage ﬂoor, there is less need for a reduction in the wage cushion
in low-productivity ﬁrms, while there is more room for an increase in the wage cushion in high-
productivity ﬁrms. Furthermore, a higher productivity spread also implies a reallocation of workers
towards the high-productivity ﬁrms. Both these eﬀects contribute to an increase in the average
wage cushion.










which, due to the potentially opposite signs of ∂w/∂s and ∂ /∂s, is generally ambiguous. From






β + s2 (1 − β)
￿
4s2β + 2 − s2￿￿
(4s2β − s2 + 1)
2 < 0, (23)
implying that the eﬀect via the industry wage ﬂoor always dominates, establishing a negative
relationship between ﬁrm heterogeneity and average actual paid wages.
Based on the above analysis, we postulate the following hypotheses for the empirical analysis.
Industries exhibiting larger ﬁrm heterogeneity, measured by a mean-preserving spread of labour
productivites, are expected to be characterised by
(i) a lower industry wage ﬂoor;
(ii) a higher (average) wage cushion;
11(iii) a lower (average) actual paid wage.
3 Empirical implementation
3.1 Data
We test our theory using data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) for the years 1991 to 2000. This is
an administrative dataset that comprises information on virtually all workers, ﬁrms and collective
agreements from the private sector in Portugal. It gathers information from a compulsory census
run by the Ministry of Employment, covering the population of ﬁrms with wage earners in manu-
facturing and services. Each ﬁrm is required to provide information on an annual basis about its
characteristics and those of each individual that comprises its workforce.
Firm-level information includes annual sales, number of employees, industry code, geographical
location and date of constitution. The set of worker characteristics includes wages (monthly base
wage and other components of pay), gender, schooling, date of starting, occupation and hours
worked. In addition, the worker data include unique identiﬁers for the collective bargaining agree-
ment that covers the worker, as well as detailed information about the individual’s job category
for collective bargaining purposes. In the period 1991—2000, the number of diﬀerent job categories
ranges between 3014 and 3472 in each year, comprising a total of 5194 diﬀerent categories over the
whole period. The ﬁrst digit of the collective agreement identiﬁer indicates the type of contract that
covers the worker (sectoral, multi-ﬁrm, ﬁrm, mandatory regime). A worker may also be matched
to the ﬁrm.
An important feature of these data is that particular care is placed on the reliability of the
information. Indeed, the data are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking the employer’s
compliance with labour law. Moreover, Portuguese law makes it compulsory for ﬁrms to make this
information available to every worker in a public place of the establishment.
Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the accuracy of worker and ﬁrm data,
according to the procedures outlined in the Appendix. After these checks, we kept for analysis
full-time wage earners working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65, earning at least
the national minimum wage, employed in ﬁrms located in mainland Portugal. As in Cardoso and
Portugal (2005), because the contractual wage is computed as the mode of the distribution of base
wages for each job category within each collective agreement, only categories comprising at least
50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers were kept for the analysis. In line with
the theoretical framework of the previous section, we restrict the analysis to workers covered by
sectoral agreements, who represent about 88% of these workers. The resulting panel comprises
information on 1,886,703 workers, 216,681 ﬁrms and 198 sectoral agreements, yielding a total of
127,420,900 worker-year observations.
3.2 Computing the wage ﬂoor and the wage cushion
Following Cardoso and Portugal (2005), we distinguish between contractual wages, wage cushion
and actual wages. By comparing the wage information available in Quadros de Pessoal with
information on contractual wages for each worker category published in collective agreements,
Cardoso and Portugal show that the mode of the base wage distribution for each professional
category within each collective agreement corresponds strongly, in some cases with remarkable
accuracy, to the wage that is set via collective bargaining.15 We adopt the same procedure here to








where wkt is the overall monthly earnings actually received by individual k in year t (including the
base wage, tenure-related and other regularly paid components) and wcat is the modal base wage
for the worker’s professional category, within the collective agreement that covers the worker in year
t. The following subsection outlines the empirical strategy for examining the eﬀect of the levels
and distribution of ﬁrm productivities in each industry on contractual wages, the wage cushion and
actual wages.
3.3 Econometric model
We adopt the following econometric speciﬁcation:
wagekt = xktγ + yjtδ + αφat + βsat + υk + λv + τr + θt +  kt. (25)
As the dependent variable, we consider the central wage ﬂoor, the wage cushion and actual wage,
as deﬁned in the previous sub-section: wagekt = {wcat,ηkt,wkt}. Our central variables φat and sat
measure, respectively, the mean and the spread of ﬁrm labour productivity within the collective
agreement that covers the worker. Our main interest lies in the coeﬃcient β, which captures the
eﬀect of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The mean of ﬁrm labour productivity, φat, is included since, in order
meaningfully to compare ﬁrm heterogeneity across collective agreements, we obviously need to
control for the mean. The set of explanatory variables also includes: xkt, a vector of individual
15Cardoso and Portugal explicitly check the relationship between the contractual wages and the mode of the base
wage distribution for each worker category, within each collective agreement, for three diﬀerent (and large) industries
in two diﬀerent years. They ﬁnd that the correlation between the contractual wage and the mode of the base wage
ranges from 77 to 99 percent.
13characteristics; yjt, a vector of characteristics for ﬁrm j at which worker k is employed in year t;
υk, a pure individual unobserved eﬀect; λv, a pure industry eﬀect; τr, a pure region eﬀect; θt a
ﬁxed time eﬀect and, ﬁnally,  kt is an exogenous disturbance.
In the empirical analysis, we measure φat and sat, respectively, as the average and the mean
absolute deviation (MAD) of ﬁrm sales per employee within the collective agreement that covers
the worker. In the absence of data on intermediate inputs and inventories, the use of sales per
employee to proxy ﬁrm labour productivity is standard in the literature (see, for example, Franco
and Philippon, 2007).16 The vector of worker control variables includes gender, age, age squared,
years of schooling, tenure, tenure less than one year and four occupational dummies based on the
1988 International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88). This classiﬁcation provides
four skill-levels which are based on (i) the level of general education required to perform a job;
and (ii) the job-related formal training required to perform a job (ILO, 1990).17 The vector of
ﬁrm characteristics includes ﬁrm size (log of number of employees), age, and nominal average
labour productivity (log of ﬁrm annual sales per employee). To control for unobserved industry
characteristics, all regressions include a full set of ﬁfteen industry-dummies, corresponding to the
economic classiﬁcation code (1st revision) deﬁned at the 2-digit level, for manufacturing and services
industries. In addition, the regressions include ﬁve regional dummies to account for disparities in
earnings across regions. As is standard in the literature, wages and ﬁrm sales are deﬂated by the
CPI and the GDP deﬂator, respectively.18
4 Summary statistics and econometric results
Due to computational constraints, in the regression analysis we use a 20 percent random sample
of workers from the checked panel (keeping all yearly information for the sampled workers). Table
1 presents descriptive statistics on these data. In Figure 1, we also illustrate how the average
productivity and the productivity spread vary across 139 diﬀerent collective agreements in the year
2000, where we group the data into two diﬀerent categories of economic activity: manufacturing
and services.
The average wage cushion is 0.23, conﬁrming the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc arrangements
following industry-level collective bargaining for wage formation.19 Furthermore, the summary
statistics reveal that our measures of the productivity spread exhibit signiﬁcant dispersion.20 Ac-
16As a robustness check, we also use other alternative spread measures. See Section 4.2.
17See the Appendix for a detailed description.
18Data on CPI and GDP deﬂators come from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal.
19The wage cushion is negative whenever the observed mode of base wage is an inaccurate measure of the bargained
wage or when workers do not work the full month (either because they are sick or hired during the month). This
happens for 16.67% of our sample.
20The productivity spread measures are null when a single wage agreement covers a single ﬁrm, which corresponds
14Table 1: Descriptive statistics, Regressions data, 1991-2000
Mean SD Min Max
Wage ﬂoor (log of wage ﬂoor in Euros) 6.06 0.33 5.37 8.79






0.23 0.35 -2.77 4.57





0.11 0.32 -2.82 4.57
Male 0.61 0.49 0 1
Schooling 6.23 3.29 0 16
Age 36.01 11.03 16 65
Age squared 1,418.50 861.01 256 4,225
Tenure 8.01 8.41 0 54
Tenure less than 1 year 0.11 0.31 0 1
Skill 1.97 0.61 1 4
Firm size (log) 4.26 1.89 0 9.56
Firm age 21.55 19.50 0 305
Firm labour productivity (log) 3.72 1.25 -15.16 14.25
Average productivity (103Euros) 75.94 73.15 0.03 1,368.40
Median productivity (103Euros) 38.74 32.58 0 330.68
Productivity spread (103Euros)
Mean absolute deviation from the mean (MAD) 72.54 103.82 0 2,482.06
Mean absolute deviation from the median (MADme) 56.67 65.16 0 1,328.44
Standard deviation (SD) 538.61 1,692.02 0 14,706.36
Observations 1,484,243
cording to Figure 1, the dispersion tends to be larger in services when compared to manufacturing
sectors. Such variation will be particularly useful for identifying the eﬀect of ﬁrm heterogeneity on
wages in the econometric analysis.
It is also worth noticing that Figure 1 shows a quite clear positive correlation between average
productivity and productivity spread. In addition, Table 1 reveals that the (within-industry)
mean of productivity tends to be considerably higher than the median, implying that productivity
distributions within industries/collective agreements tend to be right-skewed. This is consistent
with a pattern where a higher productivity dispersion is mainly driven by the presence of some high-
productivity ﬁrms that increase the mean, but not necessarily the median, of ﬁrm productivities.
4.1 Baseline model
In order to control for worker-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the longitudinal nature
of the data and estimate individual ﬁxed-eﬀects models. In addition, the regressions include a
full set of industry, region, and year dummies. For each estimate, we provide in parentheses the
to 25 observations in our sample.
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standard errors that account for clustering by collective wage agreement and year. Table 2 presents
the ﬁxed eﬀects results for our baseline speciﬁcation (25).
The results shown here clearly conﬁrm the predictions from our theoretical model. Even after
including a large set of worker and ﬁrm controls, a larger ﬁrm heterogeneity, expressed by the
mean absolute deviation (MAD), implies a signiﬁcantly (at the 1 per cent level) lower industry
wage ﬂoor and higher wage cushion. The actual wage declines as well, as the eﬀect on the wage
ﬂoor dominates the eﬀect on the wage cushion. Moreover, in all three cases, the magnitude of
the impacts, measured by the implied wage-spread elasticities, is noticeable. For instance, if ﬁrm
heterogeneity in the industry doubles, the elasticity ﬁgures indicate that, on average, the wage ﬂoor
declines by 3.7%, the wage cushion rises by 2.3% and the actual wage paid reduces by 1.4%. These
impacts are certainly non-negligible, taking into account that the distribution of the MAD across
sectoral agreements and time is very wide. For example, half of the mean MAD is at the 41st
percentile, while the double of the mean MAD is at the 92nd percentile.
The eﬀect of ﬁrm labour productivity has the expected positive sign for all wage measures.
Notice also that the eﬀect on the wage cushion is pronouncedly stronger than on the wage ﬂoor,
suggesting the presence of ﬁrm-level rent-sharing, which is a key mechanism in our theoretical
model. The impact of the average productivity level qualitatively follows that of ﬁrm-level pro-
ductivity, except for the case of the wage cushion, where there is a negative relationship. This
probably reﬂects the aforementioned degree of asymmetry in the productivity distribution. The
16remaining estimates shown in the table are all signiﬁcant. They are generally in line with Cardoso
and Portugal’s (2005) ﬁndings (based on a single cross-section) that the wage cushion tends to
stretch the impact of worker and ﬁrm attributes on wages.
Table 2: Heterogeneity and wages, ﬁxed eﬀects
Variable Wage ﬂoor Wage cushion Actual wage
Schooling .002∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .007∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0005) (.0005)
Age .014∗∗∗ .009∗∗∗ .023∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Age2 -.0002∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗∗ -.0003∗∗∗
(.00001) (.00001) (.00002)
Tenure .003∗∗∗ -.0007∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Tenure less 1 year -.0008 -.014∗∗∗ -.015∗∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Skill 2 .096∗∗∗ -.050∗∗∗ .046∗∗∗
(.005) (.004) (.003)
Skill 3 .229∗∗∗ -.119∗∗∗ .110∗∗∗
(.008) (.007) (.004)
Skill 4 .219∗∗∗ -.052∗∗∗ .167∗∗∗
(.013) (.013) (.006)
Firm size (log) .015∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗
(.0008) (.0009) (.001)
Firm age -.0002∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗ -.0005∗∗∗
(.00006) (.0001) (.00008)
Firm labour productivity (log) .001∗∗ .005∗∗∗ .006∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Average productivity .0009∗∗∗ -.0006∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.00008)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0005∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗
(.00007) (.00007) (.00004)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.037] [.023] [-.014]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .076 .029 .085
F statistic 117.18 74.87 170.84
P-value .000 .000 .000
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered by collective wage agreement and year. The regressions are estimated by ﬁxed-eﬀects and
include industry, region and time eﬀects.
17The above reported eﬀects might potentially vary — at least quantitatively — across diﬀerent
industry sectors, due to institutional diﬀerences that are not yet accounted for in our empirical
analysis. For example, in manufacturing wage bargaining takes place mainly along industry di-
visions. This contrasts to some extent with service sectors, where bargaining along occupational
divisions is more prevalent. In order to account for such diﬀerences, we have run separate regres-
sions for manufacturing and services, respectively. It turns out that the results, which are reported
in the Appendix (Table A.3.1.), show very similar eﬀects both in magnitude and sign.
One potential concern with the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates is that both the contractual wage and
the actual paid wage are left-censored. The former cannot fall below the national minimum wage,
while the latter cannot be lower than the union wage ﬂoor, implying that the wage cushion cannot
be negative.21 As a result, our least squares estimates might be biased. We directly address this
concern by estimating Tobit random eﬀects models.
An inspection of Table 3 shows that controlling for censoring eﬀects only reinforce our previous
ﬁndings. The marginal eﬀects of the spread of ﬁrm labour productivity are (again) signiﬁcant at the
1 per cent level and slightly larger than the ones found earlier. The elasticity eﬀects are therefore
larger. The exception is the elasticity for the wage cushion. According to the Tobit estimates, if
ﬁrm heterogeneity doubles, then the wage ﬂoor reduces by 5.7% while the actual wage paid reduces
by 2.7%. The remaining estimates, once more, are signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level and generally
follow previous literature.
As a further robustness check, we have also used weighted measures for the ﬁrst and second
moments of the ﬁrms productivity distribution. To do so, we compute the mean and the spread of
ﬁrm productivity within each collective agreement using the information on ﬁrm sales per employee
at the worker-level. The resulting measures are, therefore, weighted by the number of workers in
each ﬁrm. The results, shown in the Appendix (Table A.3.2.), are qualitatively similar.
Finally, before extending the empirical analysis to consider alternative measures of some key
variables, we should mention some endogeneity concerns that may aﬀect our analysis. Our theo-
retical model gives us a basis for interpreting the empirical ﬁndings in a causal way, where industry
characteristics (most notably ﬁrm heterogeneity) determine wage setting. However, it should be
stressed that, if these industry characteristics are not exogenous to wages, we cannot rule out the
possibility of a reversed causality. This would happen, for instance, if a lower wage ﬂoor creates
higher productivity dispersion because it allows the survival of low-productivity ﬁrms in the given
industry. However, while this is a potential explanation, it does not seem to ﬁt with the observed
positive correlation between the average and the spread of ﬁrm productivities (cf. Figure 1).
21Censoring aﬀects 2% and 17% of the observations in each case, respectively.
18Table 3: Heterogeneity and wages, Tobit random eﬀects
Variable Wage ﬂoor Wage cushion Actual wage
Male .092∗∗∗ .117∗∗∗ .203∗∗∗
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
Schooling .018∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .039∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002)
Age .019∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Age2 -.0002∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗∗ -.0003∗∗∗
(2.06e-06) (2.88e-06) (2.78e-06)
Tenure .004∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .005∗∗∗
(.00005) (.00006) (.00006)
Tenure less than 1 year -.005∗∗∗ -.016∗∗∗ -.020∗∗∗
(.0006) (.0009) (.0008)
Skill 2 .139∗∗∗ -.028∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗
(.0007) (.0009) (.0009)
Skill 3 .325∗∗∗ -.010∗∗∗ .260∗∗∗
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Skill 4 .346∗∗∗ .221∗∗∗ .470∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Firm size (log) .025∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .048∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Firm age -.0003∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗ -.0005∗∗∗
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002)
Firm labour productivity (log) .004∗∗∗ .016∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0003) (.0002)
Average productivity .001∗∗∗ -.0005∗∗∗ .0007∗∗∗
(.00001) (.00002) (.00002)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0008∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗ -.0004∗∗∗
(7.26e-06) (.00001) (9.49e-06)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.057] [.021] [-.027]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
Log likelihood 35,782 -496,148 -319,937
χ2 statistic 530,255 134,393 516,292
P-value .000 .000 .000
Sigma-u .182 .236 .266
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. The regressions are estimated by
the tobit random model and include industry, region and time eﬀects.
Alternatively, a potential endogeneity problem may be driven by the so-called reﬂection eﬀect:
that the average behaviour in some group may inﬂuence the behaviour of the individuals that
comprise the group (Manski, 1993). In our paper, this eﬀect could aﬀect in particular the positive
19association between industry average productivity, on the one hand, and the wage ﬂoor and actual
wages on the other hand. Arguably, however, the fact that the wage ﬂoor does not simply result
from aggregation across ﬁrms, but rather from centralised collective bargaining, implies that this
potential concern might be relatively less important in our context.
Table 4: Alternative spread and location measures
Variable Wage ﬂoor Wage cushion Actual wage
STANDARD DEVIATION
Firm labour productivity (log) .002∗∗∗ .005∗∗∗ .007∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Average productivity .0002∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗∗ .00008∗∗
(.00005) (.00004) (.00003)
Productivity spread (SD) -3.47e-07∗∗∗ 1.61e-06 -1.87e-06∗∗∗
(1.27e-06) (1.12e-06) (6.71e-06)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.002] [.0009] [-.001]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .073 .029 .085
F statistic 115.68 72.61 167.64
P-value .000 .000 .000
MEDIAN
Firm labour productivity (log) .001∗∗ .005∗∗∗ .006∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Median productivity .0008∗∗∗ -.0006 .0002∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0009) (.0009)
Productivity spread (MADme) .00002 -.0002 .00001
(.0003) (.0009) (.0002)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [.001] [-.0005] [.0006]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .076 .029 .085
F statistic 117.38 76.02 172.23
P-value .000 .000 .000
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. All regressions include industry, region
and time eﬀects. Robust standard errors are clustered by collective wage agreement and year in the ﬁxed
eﬀects model.
4.2 Alternative measures of φat and sat
As an alternative to the MAD, we use the standard deviation (SD) of ﬁrm sales per worker within
each collective agreement as a measure of the productivity spread. Similarly, as an alternative
20measure of central tendency, we use median productivity. Table 4 reports some selected results
from the ﬁxed eﬀects model.22
Using the SD as an alternative measure of the productive spread, we obtain further conﬁrmation
of our theoretical predictions. The major diﬀerence is the size of the eﬀects, which are now much
smaller than the ones initially found.23 However, it is worth noticing that the mean and the
volatility of this series are also much higher, as suggested by the summary statistics in Table 1.
This means that, when compared to the MAD, the same relative change in the productivity spread
measured by the SD implies a much larger absolute variation. Thus, some caution is needed when
comparing the results using these two diﬀerent measures of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Results are not the same, however, when replacing the mean of ﬁrm productivities with the
median. In particular, we see that the eﬀects of ﬁrm heterogeneity (when measured from the
median) on wages now have opposite signs (but are statistically insigniﬁcant). How can we conciliate
these ﬁndings with our theoretical analysis? One possible explanation can be advanced if we
consider again the descriptive statistics summarised in Table 1 and Figure 1. When productivity
distributions are right-skewed, it matters whether we use the mean or the median as a measure
of central tendency. In our context, the appropriate choice depends on union preferences. If
trade unions are rent-maximisers, as we assume in our theoretical model, they care equally much
about rents accruing to workers in all ﬁrms, regardless of the ﬁrms’ locations in the productivity
distribution. In this case, the mean of ﬁrm productivity is clearly the appropriate choice in our
empirical analysis.
Why would using the median, instead of the mean, lead to opposite (albeit statistically in-
signiﬁcant) eﬀects? When there is a positive correlation between the mean and spread of ﬁrm
productivities, as in our dataset, this can be explained by the following simple example. Consider
an industry where the most productive ﬁrm becomes even more productive. This will increase
the mean productivity and the productivity dispersion, but not the median (assuming there are
more than two ﬁrms in the industry). The trade union will respond by increasing the wage ﬂoor
in order to extract more rents from the ﬁrm that became more productive. However, in order to
protect employment in less productive ﬁrms, the wage increase is less than it would have been if
the union was maximising rents only from the high-productivity ﬁrm. Thus, when controlling for
mean productivity, a higher productivity dispersion reduces the wage ﬂoor, as we would expect
from our theoretical analysis. What happens in this example if we use the median instead of the
mean? Since a productivity increase at the top end of the distribution will increase dispersion
but leave the median unaﬀected, we get a direct positive relationship between the productivity
22Full results are available from the authors upon request.
23The only qualitative diﬀerence is that the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the wage cushion is not statistically signiﬁcant
in the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
21spread and the wage ﬂoor, and thus arrive at the exact opposite conclusion. In other words, when
productivity distributions are right-skewed and there is a positive correlation between the mean
and spread of ﬁrm productivities, the median is less able to capture the fact that average produc-
tivity is higher in more dispersed industries. As a result, if union behaviour is not too far away
from rent-maximisation, spread measures based on the median are primarily capturing changes in
average productivity, leading to spurious correlations between ﬁrm heterogeneity and wages.
Table 5: Heterogeneity and alternative concepts of wages
Variable Wage cushion Actual wage
FIXED EFFECTS
Firm productivity (log) .005∗∗∗ .006∗∗∗
(.0006) (.0005)
Average productivity -.0007∗∗∗ .0002∗∗∗
(.0001) (.00006)
Productivity spread (MAD) .0004∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗∗
(.00006) (.00004)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [.027] [-.009]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .021 .075
F statistic 43.40 189.36
P-value .000 .000
TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS
Firm productivity (log) .022∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0003)
Average productivity -.0009∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗
(.00002) (.00003)
Productivity spread (MAD) .0005∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗
(.00001) (.00001)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [.037] [-.011]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243
Log likelihood -637,561 -473,415
χ2 statistic 113,036 356,297
P-value .000 .000
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. All regressions include
industry, region and time eﬀects. Robust standard errors are clustered by collective
wage agreement and year in the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
224.3 Alternative wage measures
So far, we have assumed that the wage cushion in (24) is fully driven by ﬁrm-speciﬁc arrangements
following industry-wide collective bargaining. As noted by Cardoso and Portugal (2005), however,
some industry agreements also include clauses on tenured-related payments. In such cases, the
central union might have some direct inﬂuence on the wage cushion deﬁned in (24), thereby chal-
lenging our interpretation of the econometric results. To address this concern, we follow Cardoso
and Portugal and redeﬁne the wage cushion, and consequently the actual paid wage, in base wages
only. In other words, we exclude tenure-related and other regular components of pay from actual
paid wages when computing the wage cushion. The regression results for these alternative measures
of the wage cushion and the actual wage are presented in Table 5.
We ﬁnd that the relationship between the various measures of ﬁrm heterogeneity considered
earlier and the wage cushion (actual wage) remains positive (negative) and statistically signiﬁcant in
all speciﬁcations. Moreover, in either model — ﬁxed eﬀect or Tobit random eﬀect — the magnitudes
of the eﬀects for these alternative wage measures are very similar (slightly larger for the wage
cushion; slightly smaller for the actual wage).
5 Concluding remarks
If actual paid wages result from a combination of industry-wide and ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage setting —
as in most countries with a certain degree of union centralisation — what determines the relative
importance of the two levels in such a two-tiered wage setting system? In this paper we have oﬀered
one particular contribution to answering this question, by focusing on the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity
within industries. While it is intuitively plausible that ﬁrm heterogeneity should play a role in
determining the relationship between centralised and decentralised wage setting, the present paper
is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst attempt to analyse — theoretically and empirically — this
particular relationship.
Our results are clear and consistent. There is a systematic correlation between ﬁrm heterogene-
ity and wages set at the two stages. In more heterogeneous industries, the industry wage ﬂoor is
lower, while the average wage cushion is higher. Furthermore, the former eﬀect dominates the lat-
ter, implying that actual paid wages are lower, all else equal, in more heterogeneous industries. The
mechanisms behind these relationships are explained by a theoretical model of a unionised Cournot
oligopoly with ﬁrm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. The relation-
ships are then empirically conﬁrmed by using a panel dataset covering virtually all workers, ﬁrms
and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000, and
the results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and heterogeneity measures.
23By way of conclusion, it should be stressed that in this paper we have only focused on one
particular factor — ﬁrm heterogeneity — in explaining the discrepancy between centrally bargained
and actually paid wages. Although we have shown that this is a signiﬁcant part of the explanation,
it is clearly not the whole explanation. In particular, it would be interesting to explore also the
role of worker heterogeneity. While worker attributes obviously aﬀect wages set in each stage, it is
tempting to speculate that worker heterogeneity per se could potentially play a role in explaining
the relationship between bargained and actually paid wages. This is, however, left for further
research.
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A.1. Deﬁnition of skill groups
In the econometric analysis, we include a group of dummy variables to control for the skill level
associated with the worker’s occupation, as deﬁned in the ISCO-88 classiﬁcation. Table A.1 presents
the deﬁnition of skill groups.
Table A.1. Description of ISCO skills
Skill Description ISCO Major group
Skill level 1 Competence associated with general
education usually acquired by com-
pletion of compulsory education.
(9) Elementary occupations
Skill level 2 Requires knowledge as for ﬁrst skill
level, but typically a longer period of
worker-related training or work ex-
perience.
(4) Clerks; (5) Service workers and
shop and market sales workers; (6)
Skilled agriculture and ﬁshery; (7)
Craft and related workers; (8) Plant
and machine operators and assem-
blers
Skill level 3 Requires a body of knowledge as-
sociated with a period of post-
compulsory education but not to de-
gree level.
(3) Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals
Skill level 4 Normally requires a degree or an
equivalent period of relevant work
experience.
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials and
managers; (2) Professionals
A.2. Longitudinal linked employer-employee dataset
A.2.1. Checks on the consistency of data
After deleting observations for which the worker identiﬁcation code was invalid or missing, the initial
worker panel comprises 4,983,541 workers and 20,897,780 worker-year observations. Inconsistencies
were identiﬁed if the worker gender or date of birth was reported changing, or the highest schooling
level achieved by a worker was reported decreasing over time. In line with Cardoso (2006), the
following procedures were implemented to correct such inconsistencies:
(i) Dealing with missing values when reported data for the rest of the periods was absolutely
consistent. Whenever the gender, age or education of an individual was reported in a consistent
way but missing in some year(s), we have assigned the reported value to the missing observation.
These corrections aﬀected 0.00 percent, 1.78 percent and 0.89 percent of the observations in the
initial panel, respectively, for gender, age and schooling.
25(ii) Dealing with inconsistent data on gender, birth date or schooling over time. When informa-
tion was reported inconsistently over time, the information reported more than half of the times
has been taken as the correct one. Inconsistent values on gender were replaced, after checking that
the date of birth in the observation to be corrected was the same as the most frequently reported
date of birth for that worker. A similar procedure was followed for the birth date and education,
replacing inconsistent values with that reported more than half of the times. According to this
procedure, 0.84 percent, 2.54 percent and 5.65 percent of the observations in the initial panel have
been corrected for gender, birth date and education, respectively. All information on a worker
was dropped in case of remaining inconsistencies after the implementation of the previously de-
scribed corrections. This led to dropping 8.77 percent of the observations in the initial panel due
to inconsistencies for gender, 0.18 percent for age and 0.93 percent for education.
(iii) Deleting data on workers with remaining missing data on gender, age or schooling. Workers
with missing data after the implementation of the previous corrections were dropped. This led to
dropping 0.18 percent of the observations in the initial panel due to missing age and 0.93 percent
due to missing data on schooling. No observations were deleted due to missing information about
gender. The checked panel included 17,366,086 worker-year observations and 3,062,216 workers.
A.2.2. Constraints imposed
(i) Keeping full time workers, aged between 16 and 65 years old, earning at least the national mini-
mum wage. Only full-time workers working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65 years
old, earning at least the national minimum wage were kept for the analysis (the national minimum
wage constraint might imply dropping workers in particular categories, such as apprentices and
workers aged less than 18 years old). These restrictions led to dropping, respectively, 19.15, 2.33
and 4.04 percent of the observations in the checked panel.
(ii) Keeping job categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers.
As in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), because we are computing the contractual wage as the mode
of the distribution of base wages for each job category within each collective agreement, for each
year we have kept categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers.
These restrictions led to dropping 9.08 percent and 1.16 percent of the checked panel, respectively.
(iii) Keeping workers covered by sectoral agreements. After the previous constraints, 87.76
percent of the workers and 83.6 percent of the worker-year observations are covered by sectoral
agreements, which are kept for the analysis.
(iv) Keeping observations from manufacturing and services. After the previous constraints, the
worker panel includes 8,988,169 worker-year observations and 2,209,338 workers. We then merged
the worker data with ﬁrms operating in manufacturing and services. This yields a worker-ﬁrm panel
26with information on 8,348,861 worker-year observations, 2,049,522 workers and 251,945 ﬁrms. After
further dropping the observations for which data on the independent variables were missing, and
keeping data only from mainland Portugal, the ﬁnal worker-ﬁrm panel gathers information on
1,886,703 workers, 216,681 ﬁrms and 198 sectoral agreements for the years 1991 to 2000, yielding a
total of 7,420,900 observations. Table A.2 presents the share of observations per skill group, region
and year.
Table A.2. Summary statistics
Population Sample











Region North 45.24 45.37
Center 10.72 10.69
Lisbon and Tejo Valley 39.12 39.09
Alentejo 2.21 2.20
Algarve 2.70 2.65












Table A.3.1 Heterogeneity and wages by industry
Variables Wage ﬂoor Wage cushion Actual wage
MANUFACTURING
Firm labour productivity (log) .001∗ .003∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0009) (.001)
Average productivity .001∗∗∗ -.0008∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0008∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗ -.0003∗∗∗
(.0001) (.00008) (.00007)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.035] [.020] [-.015]
Observations 747,219 747,219 747,219
R2 within .066 .027 .067
F statistic 65.96 41.68 100.67
P-value .000 .000 .000
SERVICES
Firm labour productivity (log) .001∗∗ .005∗∗∗ .006∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Average productivity .0009∗∗∗ -.0006∗∗∗ .0002∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.00008)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0005∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗ -.0001∗∗∗
(.00007) (.00007) (.00004)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.037] [.023] [-.012]
Observations 737,024 737,024 737,024
R2 within .076 .029 .085
F statistic 117.18 74.87 170.84
P-value .000 .000 .000
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Robust standard errors
in parentheses clustered by collective wage agreement and year. The regressions are
estimated by ﬁxed-eﬀects and include industry, region and time eﬀects.
28Table A.3.2 Heterogeneity and wages, weighted measures
Variables Wage ﬂoor Wage cushion Actual wage
FIXED EFFECTS
Firm labour productivity (log) -.0002 .006∗∗∗ .006∗∗∗
(.0005) (.0007) (.0006)
Average productivity .001∗∗∗ -.0007∗∗∗ .0005∗∗∗
(.0005) (.00001) (.00007)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0006∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗ -.0003∗∗∗
(.00006) (.00006) (.00004)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.040] [.023] [-.017]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
R2 within .082 .030 .086
F statistic 114.16 72.79 171.12
P-value .000 .000 .000
TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS
Firm labour productivity (log) .002∗∗∗ .015∗∗∗ .016∗∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Average productivity .002∗∗∗ -.0006∗∗∗ .0009∗∗∗
(9.89e-06) (.00001) (.00001)
Productivity spread (MAD) -.0009∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗ -.0004∗∗∗
(6.41e-06) (8.59e-06) (8.44e-06)
Implied wage-spread elasticity [-.057] [.021] [-.028]
Observations 1,484,243 1,484,243 1,484,243
Log likelihood 42,874 -245,156 -318,532
χ2 statistic 552,217 120,222 522,900
P-value .000 .000 .000
Sigma-u .181 .217 .265
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. All regressions include
industry, region and time eﬀects. Robust standard errors are clustered by collective
wage agreement and year in the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
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